Just and Unjust Wars is an unusual and significant book, one that has to be read on two levels. First, it provides a systematic and thorough examination of the limits contained in the theory of "just war" that has evolved in Western culture. Even though a great deal of reflection has been directed since 1945 to the problem of limiting war, it is difficult-perhaps impossible-to find anything comparable to this book. There has tended to be a lack of the moral element Walzer brings to his work. Just and Unjust Wars on the first level, then, is a discussion of the limits of war that is firmly rooted in the moral tradition of just war and goes beyond what has been produced on the limiting of war by the post-World War I I generation of scholars. It is at the second level, however, that the uniqueness of this book emerges: It advances a particular concept of the nature of morality and moral reasoning in order to define and make plausible the moral grounding of the limits on war that have grown up in Western culture. Just and Unjust Wars is as much a work on moral theory as it is on war.
It is Walzer's use of history that defines him as a moralist. Walzer himself does not seem fully to realize this. He is critical of certain moral stances, notably the utilitarianism of Henry Sidgwick and what he views as scholasticism in Paul Ramsey; his own stated preference is for a morality grounded in human rights. Indeed, so far as he consciously tries to describe a base for the moral reasoning in which he engages, that base is a theory of rights. People familiar with the just war tradition will find that Walzer has his own terms for the concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello: "The Theory of Aggression" and "The War Convention." These define two parts of the book: two others are devoted to "Dilemmas of War" and "The Question of Responsibility." The fifth part is an introductory overview, "The Moral Reality of War," which in the context of this book fulfills the function of drawing the reader into Walzer's circle of discourse.
At first glance, Walzer's rendering of the jus ad bellum in terms of aggression and justifiable defense appears highly questionable. After all, one of the major works on medieval just war doctrine, Alfred Vanderpol's Lu doctrine scholastique du droil de guerre, asserts flatly that Christian just war theory is defined by reference to the prince's authority to act in the stead of God to punish evildoers and that "aggressors" does not exhaust the category of evildoers defined by medieval theorists. Coming from the other end of history, anyone familiar with twentieth-century efforts to define aggression in international law will attach to that term an extremely narrow meaning that stigmatizes as the aggressor the belligerent who fires the first shot in a war. But 
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Scientist Garrett Hardin tells us that the earth is a lifeboat, not a spaceship. We affluent Westerners had better protect our advantages in it from the world's hungry people, because they are reproducing beyond the earth's ability to sustain them. In this metaphor the great sin is compassion. Helping them means pulling more people into the lifeboat and. therefore. more human suffering in the long run because the boat has provisions for only so many.
Hardin's metaphor is the wrong one for many reasons. It would seduce us into playing the role of God with the lives of others on a massive.scale. It espouses a we-they division of the world, when "haves" and "have-nots" need instead to recognize their common humanity. I t assumes that the United States has done just about everything possible to wipe out world hunger and poverty. and, since that hasn't worked, we'd now better cgncentrate on reducing population growth in order to keep the lifeboat afloat.
The nine essays in this book. 
